About the service
I design network access on the principle of least privilege, so neither users, nor services, nor devices are considered trusted just because they're inside your perimeter. The old flat corporate network model behind a single VPN gateway is exactly what attackers count on: one stolen credential and they roam freely through your infrastructure. I replace it with identity-aware access where every request is checked against who you are, what device you're connecting from, and what you're actually authorized to reach. Access becomes a set of explicit, verifiable decisions instead of assumptions baked into network topology.
In practice, I map your applications and data flows, describe segments and policies, and place identity-aware proxies or ZTNA brokers in front of internal services. I rely on tools that actually handle production load: WireGuard and Tailscale for encrypted device-to-service tunnels, mutual TLS and short-lived certificates for service identity, device posture checks so an unpatched or unmanaged laptop simply can't reach production. Between workloads I introduce microsegmentation so one compromised zone doesn't become a breach of the whole system, and connect logging so every access decision can be audited.
I deliver working, documented configuration, not a slide deck: policy descriptions, network diagrams, an implementation plan that won't cut people off mid-migration, and a rollback path. I've transitioned teams from old VPN with zero downtime and noticeably shrunk the attack surface. I'm ready to start with a point assessment of your current access model, then phase in Zero Trust where it delivers the most impact.
— ZTNA and identity-aware proxies in front of internal applications
— Network on WireGuard and Tailscale instead of legacy VPN
— Microsegmentation, device posture, and mTLS service identity
— Audit logs, policy documentation, and phased migration plan
In practice, I map your applications and data flows, describe segments and policies, and place identity-aware proxies or ZTNA brokers in front of internal services. I rely on tools that actually handle production load: WireGuard and Tailscale for encrypted device-to-service tunnels, mutual TLS and short-lived certificates for service identity, device posture checks so an unpatched or unmanaged laptop simply can't reach production. Between workloads I introduce microsegmentation so one compromised zone doesn't become a breach of the whole system, and connect logging so every access decision can be audited.
I deliver working, documented configuration, not a slide deck: policy descriptions, network diagrams, an implementation plan that won't cut people off mid-migration, and a rollback path. I've transitioned teams from old VPN with zero downtime and noticeably shrunk the attack surface. I'm ready to start with a point assessment of your current access model, then phase in Zero Trust where it delivers the most impact.
— ZTNA and identity-aware proxies in front of internal applications
— Network on WireGuard and Tailscale instead of legacy VPN
— Microsegmentation, device posture, and mTLS service identity
— Audit logs, policy documentation, and phased migration plan
