Zero Trust network access design (ZTNA, WireGuard, micro-segmentation)

I design least-privilege network access so that no user, service, or device is trusted by default just because it sits inside your perimeter. The old model of a flat corporate network protected by one VPN concentrator is exactly what attackers count on: one stolen credential and they move sideways across everything. I replace that with identity-aware access, where every request is checked against who you are, what device you are on, and what you are actually allowed to reach. Access becomes a set of explicit, verifiable decisions rather than an assumption baked into the network topology.

In practice I map your applications and data flows, define segments and policies, and stand up an identity-aware proxy or ZTNA broker in front of internal services. I lean on modern tooling that actually holds up in production: WireGuard and Tailscale for encrypted device-to-service tunnels, mutual TLS and short-lived certificates for service identity, and device posture checks so an unpatched or unmanaged laptop simply cannot reach production. I add micro-segmentation between workloads so a compromise in one zone does not become a breach of the whole estate, and I wire in logging so every access decision is auditable.

I deliver a working, documented setup rather than slides: policy definitions, network diagrams, a rollout plan that does not lock anyone out mid-migration, and a rollback path. I have moved teams off legacy VPNs without downtime and cut their exposed attack surface dramatically. I am happy to start with a focused assessment of your current access model, then phase in Zero Trust where it buys you the most.

— ZTNA / identity-aware proxy in front of internal apps
— WireGuard and Tailscale mesh replacing legacy VPN
— Micro-segmentation, device posture, and mTLS service identity
— Audit logging, policy docs, and a phased migration plan